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This thesis focuses on issues surrounding energy regulation, and specifically regulation of 
pipelines that carry petroleum products in South Africa. The introduction of a regulator for 
petroleum pipelines is part of an ongoing process taking center stage in the South African 
government's petroleum industry policy arena. Independent regulation of energy industries is a 
recent phenomenon in South Africa. There is much activity in deciding which regulatory models 
should be adopted in the energy sector. 
The thesis analyses a government policy decision to introduce a regulator of petroleum pipelines. 
Among some of the key issues that receive attention are the following: 
• Is the petroleum pipeline industry in South Africa large enough to justify an independent 
regulator? 
• Do pipelines in South Africa enjoy monopoly rents? If they do , is the establishment of an 
independent regulator the most cost-effective way of dealing with monopoly rents? 
• How effective would such a regulator be in the current structure of the country's 
petroleum industry? Road and rail transport systems carry vast quantities of petroleum 
products. Would it be more appropriate for the regulator to include all transporters of 
petroleum products? 
The thesis concludes that for an industry of such small size as pipeline transportation in South 
Africa, the necessity of a pipeline regulator might need to be reviewed. For a variety ofreasons, 
there are strong reasons to conclude that a pipeline regulator will have minimum impact over key 
issues of the transportation of petroleum products . 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This document fulfills half of the thesis requirement for the Master of Philosophy degree in 
Energy Policy and Planning. Full-time study and supervision of the thesis was accomplished at 
the Energy and Development Research Centre, in the faculty of Engineering and Built 
Environment at the University of Cape Town. This thesis focuses on issues surrounding energy 
regulation, and specifically regulation of pipelines that carry petroleum products in South Africa. 
The introduction of a regulator for petroleum pipelines is part of an ongoing process taking center 
stage in the South African government's petroleum industry policy arena. Independent regulation 
of energy industries is a recent phenomenon in South Africa. There is much activity in deciding 
which regulatory models should be adopted in the energy sector. In the electricity sector, the 
National Electricity Regulator (NER), set up in 1995, is already an established institution. In the 
downstream gas sector, the government is establishing a gas pipeline regulator (DME, 2001 ). 
Upstream, for the first time since the 1970s, companies other than state-owned Soeker have 
become active in oil and gas exploration and the proposed Mineral Development Bill seeks to 
clarify regulation of the upstream oil and gas sector. 
In the Energy White Paper of 1998, South African government policy regarding petroleum 
pipelines states the following: 
Government will promote competition in the transportation ofliquid fuels. 
The petroleum regulatory regime will inhibit monopolistic abuse of pipelines and storage 
facilities. 
Pipelines will be required to provide non-discriminatory open access to uncommitted capacity, 
transparency of tariffs, and disclosure of cost and pricing information to a suitable authority. 
As a follow up to this policy blueprint, in early 2000, the cabinet of the government of South 
Africa decided that a regulator of petroleum pipelines should be established (Crompton, 2000). 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines issues surrounding the cabinet' s decision. It addresses the following 
questions: 
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• Is the petroleum pipeline industry in South Africa large enough to justify an independent 
regulator? 
• Do pipelines in South Africa enjoy monopoly rents? If they do, is the establishment of an 
independent regulator the most cost-effective way of dealing with monopoly rents? 
• How effective would such a regulator be in the current structure of the country's 
petroleum industry? Road and rail transport systems carry vast quantities of petroleum 
products. Would it be more appropriate for the regulator to include all transporters of 
petroleum products? 
• Would the public, or consumers of petroleum products, enjoy more protection from the 
proposed regulator than they currently enjoy from other regulatory instruments already in 
the economic system? The Competition Act, currently under amendment, will have 
significant authority over several regulators. Would a pipeline regulator offer any 
protection to a consumer that would be unavailable should the cabinet effectively apply 
the new Competition Act? 
The study follows this structure: 
1 A theoretical framework on government intervention in the energy sector 
2 A theoretical framework on regulation 
3 An international review on pipeline regulations in some selected countries 
4 An overview of the rationale and objectives for pipeline regulation in South Africa 
5 Background to petroleum pipeline regulation 
6 Government objectives 
7 A description of the transportation of petroleum liquid fuels in South Africa 
8 An analysis of the economics of petroleum pipelines 
9 Industry views on pipeline regulation 
10 Legal and regulatory aspects 
11 Regulatory options 
The essay will address the following additional research questions: 
• What options for state involvement in the transport of liquid fuels can one consider for 
South Africa? 
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• How would each of these options achieve the objectives for state intervention or 
involvement in the operation and development of South Africa's petroleum pipeline 
system? 
3. METHODOLOGY 
As part of this research, I collected significant amounts of data and information on pipeline 
regulation over a four-month period. 
The first inquiry for data was through a questionnaire sent to all stakeholders in the pipeline 
industry. I faxed the questionnaire to some stakeholders, and emailed it to others. I followed up 
the questionnaire with interviews. Personal, documented interviews were conducted with the 
following key stakeholders in the industry: 
• The Department of Minerals and Energy, the key government department tasked with 
formulation and implementation of energy policy. 
• Petronet, the national pipeline operator and also the organization which will be most 
affected by the pipeline regulator 
• Inland crude oil refiners, Sasol and Total. Sasol also manufactures about 30% of South 
Africa's liquid fuel requirements at its inland oil-from-coal synthetic fuels plants 
• Coastal crude oil refiners, BP, Shell, Engel and Caltex 
• Empowerment companies, as represented by their pressure group the African Minerals 
and Energy Forum (Arnet) 
• The airline"industry-the main users of aviation fuel 
• The Department of Transport. The department has regulatory authority on all other forms 
of transportation, but is silent on its policy position on oil and liquid fuels pipelines. 
• Transnet, the parent company of pipeline company Petronet, rail transporter Spoornet, and 
road transporter Autonet 
• The Department of Public Enterprises that, on behalf of government, is the shareholder of 
Transnet. Regulatory authority over the various Transnet divisions falls on multiple 
government departments 
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The second method of data gathering employed was interaction with stakeholders at three 
workshops. The workshops were held by the Department of Minerals and Energy in Pretoria. I 
chaired all three workshops on the following dates: 
• August 14, 2000 
• August 28, 2000 
• September 25 , 2000 
The third method applied was a literature review. Literature on regulation and government 
involvement in energy and pipeline regulation was analysed. Experiences relating to regulation of 
the electricity and gas sectors were particularly relevant in conducting a comparative analysis. 
Several theories surrounding the field ofregulation were analyzed as part of this literature review. 
These were tested against the economic circumstances and policy framework currently existing in 
South Africa. These were tested against the economic circumstances and the policy framework 
currently existing in South Africa. Most of the conclusions of this study are based upon this 
method. 
I also conducted an international review of regulation of pipelines in other countries. 
Comparative studies were conducted of how petroleum pipelines are regulated in the U.K, the 
USA and Brazil. This method was used to examine other possible regulatory options. 
4. SOUTH AFRICAN PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE 
4.1 Pipelines 
This thesis, when discussing the petroleum pipeline industry in South Africa, refers to the 
pipeline infrastructure itself and associated infrastructure. The latter comprises storage facilities 
at the start, end & intermediate points, as well as Single Buoy Moorings (SBMs). 
The pipeline infrastructure comprised multi-product pipelines and crude oil pipelines: 
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• The multi-product pipeline network is owned and operated by Petronet. A recent 
investigation conducted into Petronet's pipeline tariffs indicated that it possesses a 
degree of ability to charge monopoly prices (Letsema/Nera, 2000). Third party access, 
however, did not appear to be an issue. 
• Crude oil pipelines which are currently single-user pipelines. There are currently two of 
them. One is owned and operated by Petron et and supplies crude oil to the Natref crude 
oil refinery at Sasolburg and the other is owned and operated by Caltex and connects 
the Saldanha strategic oil storage facility to the Calref refinery in Milnerton, Cape 
Town. 
Petro net also owns and operates pipelines used for the transportation of methane rich gas from 
Sasol ' s Secunda plant to the KwaZulu-Natal area. This pipeline, now used for gas, was originally 
a liquid fuels pipeline serving Sasol 2 and 3, but was converted to transport gas a few years ago. 
This asset could be considered a liquid fuel pipeline asset "on loan" to the gas industry. 
Petronet is South Africa's major petroleum liquid fuels pipeline owner and operator. It is 
currently self-regulated. It was directly government owned and run until 1990, at which time 
Transnet was formed and Petronet became one of many Transnet divisions. Transnet is state-
owned but government has stated that some of its divisions, including Petron et, may be partially 
or fully privatized. The pipeline tariff structure, established at the beginning of Petronet's 
operation, was based on railway rates. Tariffs are distance based, and the cost per unit of distance 
decreases as distance itself increases. Petronet had no input in the creation of the initial tariffs 
(Petronet, 2000). 
When Petronet became part ofTransnet, the pipeline tariff policy and methodology were revised. 
A point-to-point tariff was implemented, and the pipeline tariff was reduced with respect to the 
rail tariff - that is to say, the pipeline tariff levels were maintained while the railways increased 
their base rate. There were no pipeline tariff increases between 1993 and 1997. Tariffs increased 
five percent in June of 1997 and another five percent in April of 1998 (Petron et, 2000). 
Petronet's pipeline network utilization is as follows. Petronet' s jet fuel line from Natref in 
Sasolburg to Johannesburg International Airport (JIA) runs at full capacity. Petronet's crude oil 
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pipeline from Durban to Sasolburg is also running close to capacity. Petronet's white (refined) 
products pipeline network runs at varied capacity, from less than 50 percent utilization to 100 
percent, depending mainly on the performance of Sasol plants. 
4.2 Single Bouy Moorings (SBMs) 
There are two SBMs in South Africa-one a crude oil SBM, the other a finished product SBM. 
The purpose of the Durban crude oil SBM, originally commissioned in 1970, is to enable crude 
oil for the three refineries it serves (Sapref, Enref and Natref) to be oflloaded from VLCCs (very 
large crude carriers), thereby minimizing freight costs. Some 80% of the crude oil refined in 
South Africa is brought in through this facility. 
The present members of the consortium that own and operate the Durban SBM are BP, Shell, 
Engen and Sasol. Total, Sasol's partner in Natref, elected not to participate in the consortium for 
reasons relating to future refinery plans at the time, although these plans did not materialize. 
Nevertheless, Total has always imported its crude oil for Natrefvia the SBM as a third party user. 
The three refineries presently operate at maximum throughput rates-utilization of the available 
SBM capacity is only about 80%. This implies that there is quite substantial scope for expansion 
ofrefinery capacity before the SBM becomes a limiting factor and it becomes necessary to install 
a second facility. Thus, at this stage, there are no firm plans for a second SBM (Nokusa, 2000). 
Third party access to the SBM has been available at a "reasonable fee" calculated to yield a fair 
return on the value of the asset based on total throughput of all users. For a vessel of typical size, 
the fee currently amounts to about 0.08 $/bbl. The fee can be compared to the "wharfage" charge 
of some 0.50 $/bbl paid to Portnet as a levy on SBM users. Smaller petroleum industry players 
have argued that this "fee" system enables large industry corporations to retain a dominant role. 
Crude received via the SBM is discharged either into the South Tank Farm on Sap refs land, 
which contains 5 tanks owned by Enref and 9 owned by Sapref, or into the NATCOS tank farm 
adjacent to the airport. Sasol and Total jointly own NATCOS tank farm on a 70%: 30% ratio 
respectively. 
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Caltex imports crude oil into the SFF storage facilities in Saldanha Bay where Caltex leases one 
of the SFF tanks. Caltex owns and operates the Saldanha Bay-Milnerton pipeline that is used to 
transport the crude to its refinery at Milnerton. 
4.3 Product Storage Facilities 
Depending on location, product storage is used primarily in conjunction with some or all of the 
following transport modes: coastal tanker, road, rail or via the Petronet pipeline network. While 
some storage is used for product imports and exports, it is mainly geared towards the primary 
function of distributing refinery production, which accounts for the largest part of the total 
throughput. Large-scale importation of products does not presently occur because local refining 
can largely satisfy the national requirements. Adequate tankage exists, however, to handle 
occasional imports. 
Coastal terminals and inland distribution depots operate in some 100 different locations around 
the country. Over the years the network has been rationed to a considerable extent, which has 
increased its efficiency and brought about cost savings both for the oil companies and their 
customers. There are still, however, reports of significant redundant capacity and inefficiency, 
which speaks to the need for an environment that provides better incentives for efficiency (Total 
S.A., 2000). 
Hospitality arrangements, in terms of which installations operated by one company provide 
storage and handling services to others, are the norm rather than the exception-but there are 
indications that the pricing structure has encouraged over-investment (Total S.A., 2000). Such 
arrangements are typically location specific, and are negotiated on commercial terms between the 
companies concerned, taking into account factors relevant to the specific location. 
Caltex owns and operates product and crude lines from the Calref refinery to the port of Cape 
Town. These lines enable product to be moved from the refinery to ships and back. All parties 
wishing to use these lines are granted access at commercial rates with the only limitation being 
that usage not interfere with normal refinery operations. 
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4.4 Possible Future Developments 
Capacity studies (Petronet, 1999) on the refined products' pipelines indicate that under normal 
operating conditions new pipeline capacity will be needed between coastal refineries and inland 
locations in ±2006, depending on assumptions made with respect to growth rate of markets, 
cross-border exports, upgrading of inland refineries, etc. 
Petro net also proposes the building of a new gas line and that the parts of the present pipeline 
system that are being used for gas be reconfigured to provide additional capacity for crude or 
product. In July 2001, inland retail outlets experienced shortages when the Sasol/Total Natref 
refinery was damaged by fire (Business Day, 23 July 2001). This brought to the fore the debate 
on the need for additional pipeline liquid fuels product delivery capacity from coastal refineries 
to the Gauteng industrial areas-which have the highest demand for refined product. The issue 
revolves around strategic plans involving a combination of storage facilities and a transportation 
infrastructure. Detailed designs have been undertaken on a pipeline from Pretoria to Beitbridge 
(on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border) and will be considered when volumes warrant its 
construction (Petronet, 2000). 
The optimization and rationalization of existing storage facilities is leaning toward fewer 
terminals at strategic locations (Total S.A. 2000). A new terminal has, however, been mooted in 
the greater Johannesburg area. One of South Africa's smallest companies, Afric Oil, has 
undertaken a study into the possibility of a SSM at Durban for the importing of refined products. 
The results of their feasibility study have not been publicized. 
4.5 Historical Background 
During the early 1960s-due to logistical problems being created with the transportation of 
refined petroleum products from Durban to the inland market areas-the then South African 
Railways and Harbours (SAR&H) undertook the construction of the first 12-inch pipeline from 
Durban to Johannesburg with an additional intake at Sasolburg. The pipeline was designed and 
constructed in order to be able to supply product from the Durban crude-oil refineries to towns en 
route to the Witwatersrand and other places. 
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At the time, two major refineries SAPREF (a joint venture between Shell and BP) and MO REF 
(Mobil refinery) were located in the Durban area. The coal-based refinery belonging to SASOL 
was located in Sasolburg. 
During the later part of the 80s, a decision was taken to commercialize the South African 
Transport Services (SATS), formally, the SAR& H, with a view to possible privatization. 
Petronet was therefore established as a strategic business unit within Transnet (formally SATS). 
Since 1965, Petronet has extended this pipeline network. Today, it owns, maintains and operates 
a network of some 3000km of high-pressure petroleum product, crude oil and gas pipelines. 
During the 1998/99 financial year, Petronet transported through its network approximately 16 
billion litres of fuel consisting of diesel, leaded and unleaded petrol , aviation turbine fuel and 
crude oil. Gas throughput for that financial year was 200 million cubic meters. The gas pipeline, 
which today transports methane rich gas from Secunda to Durban, is a converted petroleum 
pipeline. 
The refineries themselves own crude oil pipelines that feed coastal refineries. The single mooring 
buoy (SBM) for refined product at the port of Durban is jointly owned by Sasol, BP, Shell and 
Engen. The only other SBM, located at Mossel Bay, is owned by Mossgas, which uses the SBM 
for shipping refined product manufactured from gas. 
The other crude pipeline runs for 113km, from Saldanha Bay to Calref, the Caltex refinery in 
Cape Town. Petronet transferred ownership to Caltex in 1996. The Petronet liquid fuels transport 
and storage network, with 32 pump stations/depots traverses five provinces, namely Kwazulu-
Natal, Free State, Gauteng, North West and Mpumalanga. Their intake stations are the two 
refineries in Durban, the crude refinery at Coalbrook (Natref) and the synfuel plants at Secunda 
(Sasol II and III). 
The network has a large tank farm with a storage and distribution. facility at Tarlton in Pretoria 
and a capacity of 30 million litres of fuel. This facility is mainly used for over-border deliveries 
into Botswana. The pipelines range from 6 inch (150mm) to 20 inch (508 mm). 
The crude pipeline to Natref has capacity for 650 cubic metres per hour and currently runs at 
above 80% capacity. The product pipeline from Durban to Gauteng has capacity for 400 cubic 
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metres per hour and currently runs at between 30% and 100% capacity. The aviation turbine fuel 
from Natref to Johannesburg International Airport has recently been upgraded to a capacity of 
140 cubic metres per hour. It currently runs at 70% capacity. 
4.6 Industry Characteristics and Key Stakeholders 
4.6.1 Synthetic Fuels (Synfuels) 
South Africa possesses very limited commercially exploitable crude oil reserves. In 1950, in an 
attempt to reduce South Africa' s dependence on imported oil, the government initiated a 
synthetic fuels program, generating liquid fuels from coal. The synthetic fuel industry consists of 
two major entities, Sasol and Mossgas. The Sasol 1 refinery was opened in Sasolburg in 1954, 
but has later been taken out of service. Sasol 2 and 3 were opened in 1982 and 1983 in Secunda. 
They have a capacity of 150,000 bbl/d of crude oil equivalent. Mossgas, which produces 
petroleum products from natural gas, was opened in Mossel Bay in 1987, and it has a capacity of 
45 ,000 bbl/d (crude oil equivalent). In total the present synfuels capacity is 195,000 bbl/d (crude 
oil equivalent) (SANEA, 1998). 
Sasol is the world 's largest manufacturer of oil from coal (SANEA, 1998). The coal is gasified 
and then turned into a liquid fuels or petrochemical feedstock. Mossgas is state owned through 
the Central Energy Fund (CEF) group of companies, which is responsible for the government' s 
interests in the petroleum sector (Petronet is also petroleum sector). The Mossgas synthetic fuels 
plant receives natural gas and condensate from offshore gas production facilities in the 
Bredasdorp Basin through a 90-kilometre pipeline and converts the natural gas into liquid fuels. 
Imported condensate is also delivered to the synthetic fuels plant by tanker. 
The synfuels industry has been protected by regulation to ensure its survival when crude oil 
prices are too low to cover production costs . However, Sasols ' s protection is currently under 
review by government. Marketers, such as BP, Caltex, Sasol, Shell, Afric Oil, Total, Engen, and 
Zenex, are obliged to take up Sasol synfuel production in proportion to their market shares 
(ABN-AMRO, 1998). The implications of this are important for understanding possible 
developments in transport of liquid fuels. 
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4.6.2 Refining 
South Africa imports crude oil from the Middle East and other sources, with Iran p
resently its 
greatest single source of oil. Until 1954, all of the country's oil was imported in refin
ed form and 
distributed by BP, Caltex, Mobil and Shell. As demand increased, however, a dome
stic refining 
industry developed. The first refinery, Genre±: opened in Durban in 1954. Sapref, also
 in Durban, 
in 1964; Calref, in Cape Town, in 1966; and Natref, in Sasolburg, followed suit in 19
71. In 1999, 
Genrefs production capacity was 105,000 bbl/d; Saprefs capacity was 165,000 bb
l/d; Calrefs 
110,000 bbl/d; Natrefs 86,000 bbl/d. The total refinery capacity in 1999 (excludin
g synfuels) 
was 466,000 bbl/d. As a result, South Africa is one of the largest refining nations in A
frica. 
When Natrefwas established in 1971 in a joint venture by Sasol (then a state enterp
rise) Total, 
and the National Iranian Oil Company (whose participation was later bought out b
y Sasol and 
Total), Natref entered into an agreement with South African oil companies. The grou
p agreed not 
to establish a retail chain and the oil companies agreed to receive, subject to con
tract limits, 
production of the group's white products-each company doing so in proportion to
 its national 
market share. 
4.6.3 Marketing 
Existing price regulation and uptake agreements in the so called "wholesale market
ing" link of 
the chain is at the crux of the regulation oflogistics. 
The wholesale market is structured as follows. Most oil companies market branded
 products to 
customers throughout the entire country. However, in order to minimize transport co
sts, product 
exchange arrangements, known as "swaps", have been put in place. Thus, the refin
ery in each 
area produces all of the fuel products sold in that area. Wholesale marketers purcha
se fuel from 
refineries at IBLC (in bond landed cost) prices. Wholesalers then transport the fue
l to roughly 
200 depots across the country. When the fuel leaves the bulk storage depots, the oi
l companies 
blend additives to the fuels in order to distinguish between brands. From the depots, t
he products 
are transported to about 5,000 service stations and about 10,000 direct consumers. 
In terms ofliquid fuels marketing, South Africa is divided into zones, 
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based on the prevailing mode of transport. The zones are: 
• Zone A: rail 
• Zone B: road 
• Zone C: pipeline 
• Zone J: "Jowles" Transport 
The 'zone differential' (i.e. transport cost) for each zone is based on the tariff for transporting the 
product from the coast to the zone by the dominant method. Zone differentials are published in 
April each year. 
The 5,000 service stations market 92% of the country's petrol, but only 13% of the country's 
diesel oil; most diesel oil gets sold to direct consumers. Illumination paraffin is sold through a 
number of venues, including service stations, cafes, and hardware stores. 
Since the opening ofNatref, the Supply Agreement restricts Sasol from owning or operating any 
quota retail outlets and limits its share of the South African retail market to a small amount of 
diesel (22.5 megalitres) and 9 .23% of the petrol market through the "Blue Pumps." Fuel marketed 
in this way is a combination of the refined crude oil from Natref and the synthetic fuel from 
Secunda. The Blue Pump fuel is marketed throughout the Northern Limpopo, Mpumalanga, 
Gauteng, North West Province and Free State. This supply agreement is scheduled to end in 
2003. 
4.7 Government involvement and price regulation 
The fuel industry has been subject to much government intervention and regulation. During the 
OPEC shocks and the oil embargo in the 1970s, the government became more involved in the 
fuel sector than ever before. The liquid industry is regulated by legislation and by commercial 
arrangements between major entities in the industry. 
The oil embargo forced the government to develop the Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF), a subsidiary of 
CEF, by which the government became responsible for the international procurement of crude 
oil, often through third parties. The SFF bought crude oil for the South African refineries and 
built up strategic reserves of crude oil at Saldanha Bay and Witbank in Mpumalanga Province. A 
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new policy on strategic stocks has recently been developed to be in line with international trends . 
The notional price at which the refined product is sold to the wholesale marketers is based on the 
IBLC value plus a transport charge, depending on the final destination of the product. The DME, 
through the Marketing of Petroleum Activities Return (MPAR) agreement, determines the 
wholesale margins. MPAR induces competition among marketing companies for industry 
profits. Margins are set to give the industry a target rate of return on assets before taxes and 
interest. The government is required to alter the margin when the actual return falls below 10%or 
rises above 20%. 
The retail market is regulated in terms of price, the establishment location and operation and 
control of the service stations. Retail margins are set based on an industry wide cost study done 
by the DME and the Motor Industries Federation. In addition, the DME, with the Motor 
Industries Federation, also administers the Retail Rationalization Plan (RATPLAN). This plan is 
a form of self-regulation, a voluntary agreement between government and wholesale and retail 
industry players. Participants agree to supply petrol to retailers who have been established in 
accordance with the RATPLAN and who follow the regulations contained in the Petroleum 
Products Act, relating to the operation of service stations. 
In order to promote small business in the retail industry, oil compames are generally not 
permitted to operate service stations, but they can own them. The number of service stations is 
limited in order to increase throughput per station and thereby, through economies of scale, 
constrain costs in South Africa' s price controlled environment. Self-service at retail outlets is 
also prohibited to protect the jobs of station attendants. 
Other government regulation, legislation and agreements do not allow the sale of petrol at any 
other than government-approved prices, regulated in accordance with Section 2 of the Petroleum 
Products Act of 1977 (amended in 1985). Regulation affects the price of petrol. The price that 
petrol sells for depends on the world price of refined products, as reflected in the IBLC, plus the 
government controlled margins, taxes, and transportation costs. 
4.8 Pipeline Transportation and Associated Infrastructure 
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4.8.1 Characteristics of transport of liquid fuels in South Africa 
Road is the main mode of transport for liquid fuels in South Africa. There is some movement of 
product by sea, but this is mainly restricted to coastal product movement between coastal 
refineries. Rail is used quite extensively in the rail zone (zone A) and in the pipeline zone for 'on-
railing' of product. 
In zone C, 78% of liquid fuels are moved by pipeline, 11 % by road and the remainder by rail. 
However, it is interesting that more than 20% of products moved from Durban to the inland 
market are moved by road despite the existence of a pipeline infrastructure with spare capacity 
(Nera/Letsema, 2000). Only 25% of the piped products consumed in the C-zone originate from 
Durban. 
Transportation of freight by road, as a competitor to rail and pipeline, is a central issue in South 
Africa. In the sub-region, only South Africa and Namibia allow gross vehicle mass of 56t 
(Lemmer, H, 2001). Such a high GVM, which is considered overloading, creates damage on the 
roads which is estimated at R600m per year (Lemmer, H, 2001). The exclusion of this issue in 
the cabinet's decision to establish a regulator of pipelines alone is one of the central issues behind 
the arguments of this thesis. 
In countries like the US, the price ranking of fuel transport mode for long distances from the 
cheapest to the most expensive option is ship, pipeline, barge, rail and truck respectively. 
However, in the US, the maximum permissible GVM for road freighters is only 38t. In South 
Africa, road freighters are not held responsible for the damage they cause on the roads, including 
oil spills, i.e. road use charges and taxes are not levied on these users in accordance with the costs 
attributable to them. This is a cost which road freight ignores, whereas rail and pipeline 
transporters pay for infrastructure investments and maintenance (Evert H, 2001 ). 
For distances up to 425 km in South Africa, the price ranking is truck, pipeline and rail 
respectively. There are major, real concerns that road transport is not paying its share of the cost 
of road infrastructure investment and maintenance (Evert, H, 2001). The fact that this concern 
was not included in the decision to establish a regulator of pipelines raises questions about the 
adequacy of consultation that was undertaken before the decision was made. It also calls into 
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question the integrity and adequacy of the information and analysis used in formulating this 
approach to pipeline regulation. For example, Spoornet has planned to invest one billion Rand a 
year on capital investment over the next few years (Engineering News, 2001). The bulk of this 
amount is on rail infrastructure. For distances of more than 425 km, pipeline transportation 
should be the cheapest option, but it is not, in itself a major anomaly. 
The price distortions between road, rail and pipeline calls into question the logic of establishing a 
pipeline regulator alone, when in fact three transport modes are in competition. There are several 
significant issues regarding pricing of freight that must be addressed. These issues will have a 
major impact on the transportation of petroleum products. 
At face value, the price of rail transport ofliquid fuels in South Africa is high compared to road 
transport (Engineering News, October 2001 ). Petron et has to discount rail tariffs for 'on-railing' 
that it contracts from Spoomet in order to compete against road transport in some areas. This is 
because Spoomet's costs must include the costs of depreciation of their infrastructure, and the 
need for future investments. Road users, on the other hand, bear no responsibility for road 
infrastructure investment. Because road does not pay the full cost of infrastructure owing to 
regulatory shortcomings, transport by truck is ending up as a cheaper alternative (without 
assuming discounts on the return trip and without adding tolls) in 38 out of 219 road routes-
using numbers provided by the Road Freight Association of South Africa. This creates a major 
distortion on pricing and costing of the industry. 
5. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
According to neo-classical economists, social well-being (welfare) is maximized when 
consumers can freely determine their consumption and if productive resources are allocated to 
satisfy these consumption demands in the most economically efficient manner possible (Jaccard, 
1995). Economists specify several conditions, including competitive markets that will lead to 
welfare maximization. However, consumer welfare is not always maximized when private sector 
firms are left to pursue individual profit-maximizing strategies. Where consumer welfare is not 
maximized, markets are considered to have failed. 
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There are several reasons why markets can fail to operate in a way that maximizes consumer 
welfare. Such market failures in some cases can be so severe as to merit regulation despite 
attendant costs. Broadly speaking, there are three classes of market failure, and these may be 
termed problems of asymmetric information, problems of externalities and problems of 
monopoly power (Armstrong, 1995). This study focuses on the problems of monopoly power 
because this is the most relevant issue for pipeline regulation in South Africa. 
5.1 Intervention And Market Power 
Monopoly power exists when a market suffers from ineffective competition (actual or potential) 
(Armstrong, 1995). At the extreme the market is supplied by a single firm, protected by barriers 
to entry, which in the absence of regulation would face no check on the prices it could charge 
except for its consumers' willingness to pay for its products or services. In the utility industries, 
demand elasticities are often low and an unregulated monopoly could charge prices that would 
result in a dramatically inefficient allocation ofresources. 
The issue of prices is not the only problem that comes with market power. Monopolies often do 
not have sufficient incentive to cut their costs where possible nor are they as quick to introduce 
new products, or improve their products and services as firms acting in competitive markets. 
Traditionally, government authorities have conferred special rights and obligations on classes of 
industry deemed to be affected by the public interest (McGowan et al, 1992). The electricity, gas, 
telecommunications, water and other service providers have been awarded "public utility" status. 
A common feature of most of these industries is a declining cost structure that allows significant 
economies of scale (IEA, 1994 ). In such cases, economists argue the least cost producing method 
may be by a single firm. 
There remains considerable debate around the best method of delivering a public service. Some 
countries feel strongly that a public service should be kept under public ownership. Others 
believe that the private sector can deliver these services as well as, if not better than governments, 
provided governments provide proper control 
However, regardless of on which side of the debate one falls , when optimum production is 
achieved by a single firm, the situation is described as a natural monopoly. For example, 
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duplicating pipelines for petroleum or gas transportation, or electricity transmission lines does not 
constitute the most efficient use of scarce resources. Thus, especially in relatively small markets 
such as South Africa, it is not economically efficient to achieve competition in pipeline 
transportation of liquid fuels by establishing competing pipeline networks. 
The absence of competition in monopoly markets has prompted governments to intervene in 
order to ensure that monopolies do not abuse their power at the expense of the customers they 
serve (IEA, 1994). The roles of government in such cases go beyond the protection ofcustomers 
from monopoly practices. In addition to regulation designed to impose safety, environmental, and 
other standards, the government's role can include the promotion of specific policy objectives, 
fuels, technologies, etc. 
The two main approaches used to control the behavior of a utility are direct intervention and 
regulation. In South Africa, the government controls pipeline operator Petronet through a web of 
regulations administered by the Department of Minerals and Energy. The government could also 
intervene in the affairs of Petronet using its role as shareholder of Petronet through the latter's 
parent company, Transnet, which in tum is owned through The Department of Public Enterprises, 
a government department. 
The recent trend
1 of the South African government policy has been to move away from direct 
intervention through state-ownership to control through regulation by independent regulators. 
5.2 Regulation 
Economic regulation has been defined as a process of substituting for competition by imposing 
on a public utility a code of conduct that simulates the behavior of a company as though it were 
in a competitive market. In a broad sense, the power of a regulator to set rates and ensure that all 
applications receive non-discriminatory service simulates competitive conditions, which 
generally tend to minimize the private and social costs of providing services to consumers who 
are willing and able to pay for them (IEA, 1994). 
1 In many economic sectors including telecommunications, electricity and gas. (See Independent Communications 
Authority of South Africa- est. 1999; National Electricity Regulator - est. 1995; Gas Pipelines Regulatory.] 
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Three types of government regulation are most relevant to transportation by
 pipelines: 
• Regulation of standards that may be used to shape the behavior of firms
 in such areas as 
health, safety and pollution control. 
• Structural regulations, which take place when a regulatory authority d
etermines which 
firms can or must engage in particular activities and the relationships betw
een these firms . 
An example is the evaluation in certain countries of the need for ne
w pipelines and 
administration of licenses for them. 
• Conduct-regulation that involves government measures to control the co
nduct of a given 
enterprise. 
Western governments have tended to direct regulation of pipelines through s
tate ownership, while 
in the United States the federal and state governments have attempted to d
irect the behavior of 
sta.te monopolies by regulating aspects of their conduct (IEA, 1995
). In South Africa, 
independent pipeline owner Petronet is owned and controlled by the state. T
he refineries own all 
the other pipelines whose product they supply. 
5.3 Pipeline Regulation 
• The four major reasons for regulating pipeline transportation are: 
• Pipelines exhibit extensive technical economies of scale. 
• Pipelines are not subject to significant intermodal competition. In Sou
th Africa, the 
situation is different because pipelines currently face competition from the 
road. 
• Product transportation by pipeline, whether it be gas or petroleum involv
es sizable capital 
investments, implying appreciable barriers to entry. 
• For environmental reasons, governments often wish to limit the number 
of pipelines. 
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5.3.1 Natural Monopolies 
Pipelines generally exhibit economies of scale. As a conse
quence, pipelines have decreasing 
average and marginal costs of production (IEA, 1994). Give
n sufficient product volumes, the 
larger the pipeline that is built, the lower the tariff required to
 produce a certain net return on the 
investment. The reason is that, as a pipeline's size is increased
, its costs increase less than linearly 
while throughput increases exponentially. 
According to traditional analysis, the result of decreasing co
sts of production implies that each 
pipeline could, if unregulated, be a natural monopoly in the a
rea it serves, since an expansion of 
capacity results in a reduction in average costs per unit transpo
rted. The potentially strong market 
power of pipelines, especially gas pipelines, also stems to a 
large degree from lack of effective 
intermodal competition. This is not necessarily true of petr
oleum product pipelines in South 
Africa, where tankers, barges and road and rail trucks compete
 with pipelines (Nokusa, 2000). 
5.3.2 Competition 
Regulation may be used to introduce competition. An exam
ple is the abrogation of monopoly 
rights to build pipelines. In most cases, introducing competiti
on implies some kind of mandatory 
access to pipeline services, i.e. requiring the pipeline to tran
sport product/s on behalf of third 
parties under certain conditions. 
Although mandatory open access is a central element in mos
t attempts to create competition in 
pipelines, particularly gas markets, it should be kept in mind 
that it is a means rather than an end 
(IEA, 1995). Competition may be achieved in other ways, and
 open access alone is not sufficient 
to produce effective competition. For instance, freedom to bu
ild a pipeline may be an instrument 
to introduce competition in areas with more than one potentia
l supplier of product. Investment in 
pipelines however, requires considerable financial strength




6. AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PIPELINE REGULATIONS 
6.1 Scope of Review 
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief outline of how the issue o
f petroleum pipeline 
regulation is handled in other countries. The section focuses on what is
 covered by primary 
legislation and how it is regulated. It is not intended to be an exhaustive summa
ry, but to provide 
a guide to some of the options already in place in various countries. The 
bulk of the literature 
used in this chapter was sourced through Econ (Centre for Economic Analy
sis) of Norway. 
In some countries, the primary source of government intervention is throug
h the auspices of a 
state-owned company. However, since the South African government is spe
cifically interested in 
legislative options, and is looking towards reducing the ownership rol
e of the state in the 
operation of the energy sector, this document only looks at the available leg
islative options. 
6.2 The Application of Pipeline Regulation 
There are three broad types of government regulation of pipelines exercised
 in the world, namely: 
regulation of standards, structure and service (Econ, 2000). The first two c
over the issues of the 
need for a pipeline and its safe operation, while the latter governs the con
duct of the operators. 
The regulation of standards and structure is broadly similar in count
ries with legislation 
governing pipeline operations. In this research, I highlight the core regulator
y elements in these 
areas and mention others that are not universally employed. 
The main difference between types ofregulations is in the conduct of the op
erator in their service 
role. There are two broad approaches that are examined by comparing the
 UK and US systems 
that relate to transport tariff setting. Because of the difference in approach t
o service regu-lation, I 
have explored this area in more detail. 
Whilst the discussion below focuses on the form ofregulation and its cover
age, it is important to 
consider the rules governing appeals both by pipeline owners and third part
ies. This applies both 
to challenging construction licenses and decisions made by the government/
regulator. This could 




6.3 Regulation of standards and structure 
The regulation of standards and structure is relatively 
straightforward and there is a general 
consensus concerning the key issues that need to be cove
red (Econ, 2000). These are: 
• Safety-regulations governing the design, constructio
n, operation, maintenance and 
safety management of pipelines. 
• Pollution control-regulations governing the measures
 required and system to be put in 
place to limit pollution from pipes, and the level of unacc
eptable pollution. 
• Need for a pipe and adequate size-regulations gover
ning the application to build a 
new pipeline that require the constructor to provide evide
nce that the pipe is required 
and adequately sized to avoid future duplication. 
In addition, there are a number of other issues that are i
ncluded in some legislation and not in 
others, but which in certain circumstances can be more or
 less important. These include: 
• Environmental impact assessments (EIA}-lay down t
he general manner in which an 
EIA for oil pipelines should be prepared. 
• Notification of decommissioning/restarts-this inform
ation is generally required in 
accessing other applications to build pipelines serving a 
similar supply area. In some 
instances it is required that the pipeline owner notify the
 designated authority, while 
sometimes it is only required when a new application is m
ade. 
• Rules to ensure pipeline owners have adequate funds
 to discharge their liabilities. A 
precautionary measure to ensure that constructors hav
e the funds to cover land 
acquisition and other costs before they begin work. 
In some countries (the UK for example) the regulation of
 standards and structure is incorporated 
in primary legislation, while in others (the US) it is left
 to a regulatory authority to issues the 
terms and conditions in this respect. 
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6.4 Regulation of services: General approaches 
There are two broad approaches to petroleum pipeline legislatio
n with respect to service 
provision (Econ, 2000). One is to assume that the service elem
ent is part of the normal 
commercial activities of firms and to let them conduct their busine
ss on a normal commercial 
basis. Here, there is an important caveat in that appeals can be ma
de to the government or a 
designated regulatory authority if one or more party feels they are b
eing discriminated against. 
The other approach is to be proactive, rather than sit back and wai
t for firms to appeal. In the 
latter approach the government or competent regulatory authority reg
ulates the service activities 
of the pipeline owners by means of legislation and/or regulations th
at specify in advance how 
these services may and may not be delivered. 
The first approach means that any regulatory investigation will be un
dertaken on an ad hoc basis, 
while the second approach requires a permanent body to be establi
shed to provide continuous 
regulation. These two approaches can be seen in comparing the UK
 with the US systems, while 
the Brazilian system has aspects from both. 
The UK and US approaches reflect their constitutional positio
ns (Econ 2000). The UK 
government has more powers to impose direct legislation than the US
 federal government, which 
is restricted by the constitutional position of individual States. Th
is means that the UK has 
traditionally used primary legislation as the model for regulation
, while the US has used a 
"tiered" system. Primary legislation at the federal level establishe
s general policy goals and 
individual States and regulatory agencies are left to devise means
 by which those goals are 
obtained. The Brazilian system, with its federal structure, is closer
 to the US system of tiered 
legislation. However, whether the regulatory power rests with central
 government or a regulatory 
agency is less important than how those regulations are applied. T
he UK and US systems are 
different in this respect, as are the US and Brazilian. The UK and B
razilian systems may have 
different structures, but they have a similar regulatory approach of o
nly intervening in disputes, 
while the US system involves continuous intervention and mo
nitoring by the regulatory 
authority. 
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6.5 United Kingdom Legislation 
In the UK there is a system oflicensing that covers the construction of oil pipelines (
Econ 2000). 
The principal piece of legislation is the 1962 Pipelines Act, which covers the a
uthorization 
procedures for the construction of a cross-country pipeline that exceeds 10 miles
 (16.1 km). 
There is also supplementary legislation governing the maintenance and safety of the 
pipeline, as 
well the need to undertake environmental impact assessments prior to any new const
ruction. 
Under the 1962 act there is provision for third party access to pipelines, which was in
troduced to 
'avoid the unnecessary proliferation of pipe-lines ' . The Secretary of State has power
s to require 
that a pipeline be built to a certain minimum capacity and where spare capacity exist
s to make it 
available to third parties. Under section 10 of the 1962 Act, the Secretary of State is 
allowed, "at 
the request of a third party to impose conditions granting and regulating third party 
access to an 
already existing pipe-line again where the Secretary of State is satisfied that this is 
appropriate 
and will avoid unnecessary proliferation" . According to the UK Department of
 Trade and 
Industry, the Secretary of State has never had to invoke this section, but its pres
ence in the 
legislation may have had a deterrent effect. 
In the UK the transport tariffs and access to pipes have been governed by the 
commercial 
considerations of the various parties. Pipelines do carry third party supplies, but tariffs
 and access 
conditions are not directly regulated. The 1962 Act could be invoked to regulate acce
ss, but only 
ifthere is a dispute and the Secretary of State is requested by the third party to interve
ne. To date 
this has not occurred and no guidelines exist to determine how the Secretary of 
State would 
determine the conditions to impose for third party access. 
The UK system has worked effectively without requiring the expense of a permanen
t regulatory 
authority. The threat of government action ( and indeed the uncertainties attached to th
at action in 
terms of exactly how the government will interpret the 1962 Law) has provide
d sufficient 
incentive to ensure companies reach a compromise solution independently of g
overnment. 
Intermodal competition has also tended to ensure that pipeline transport tariffs are c
ompetitive, 
further reducing the need for government intervention. 
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6.6 United States Legislation 
In the US, the federal structure means that primary legislation focuses o
n establishing policy 
objectives that the federal and state regulatory bodies then seek to implemen
t (Econ 2000). Under 
the Interstate Commerce Act (1935) and the Energy Policy Act (1992)
, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates the rates and practices of oil
 pipeline companies 
engaged in interstate transportation. The Interstate Commerce Act calls for
 the establishment of 
reasonable and just rates for pipeline transport and is the incorporation o
f the Hepburn Act of 
1906, which extended the 1887 Act to Regulate Commerce to cover 
companies operating 
pipelines transporting petroleum products. This serves to highlight the 
long history of tariff 
regulation in the US. 
FERC's objective is to "establish just and reasonable rates to encourage
 maximum use of oil 
pipelines while protecting shippers and consumers from unjustified costs."
 The FERC does not 
oversee the construction of oil pipelines or regulate the supply and price of o
il or oil products, but 
it does try to "assure shippers equal access to pipeline transportation, equal 
service conditions on 
a pipeline, and reasonable rates for moving petroleum and petroleum produ
cts by pipeline." 
In general, the US system does not leave it up to the commercial parties t
o set transport tariffs 
and access conditions and then to intervene if requested as in the UK. In
stead, these are pro-
actively regulated by the FERC. Pipeline companies are obliged to file cer
tain financial reports 
and follow certain acc;ounting procedures. A traditional cost-of-service me
thodology is used to 
determine oil pipeline transportation rates, using a trended original cost ra
te base, and a rate of 
return based upon the actual embedded debt cost and equity costs reflectin
g the pipeline's risks. 
The 1992 Energy Policy Act called for a streamlining of the FERC's
 procedures and the 
establishment of a simplified and generally applicable rate-making methodo
logy. This history has 
implications for South Africa where regulatory capacity has yet to be establi
shed and the industry 
is tiny compared to that of the USA. 
FERC regulates the energy markets through a series of Orders. Order 561 (O
ctober 1993) sets out 
the new basis for regulation of oil pipeline tariff rates. Rather than assess th
e cost structure every 
year, a formula is applied indexing the ceiling tariffs to the producer pri
ce index for finished 
goods minus 1 % (PPI-1 ). Other rate setting methodologies are permissible 
under certain defined 
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circumstances, but it is for the companies to prove they are 
eligible. The other methodologies 
include a detailed examination of the cost of service and mark
et-based rates. The former could be 
invoked if parts of the pipeline system needed to be replaced
 due to a natural disaster or other 
unexpected events. The later can only be charged if the pip
eline does not exercise significant 
market power. 
FERC believes that indexing of oil pipeline rates will elimina
te the need for much future cost-of-
service litigation. However, rates may be subject to cost-of-s
ervice review when an oil pipeline 
company claims it is significantly under recovering its costs, 
or when its rates become excessive 
in relation to actual costs. FERC will undertake an examinat
ion of the relationship between the 
annual change in the PPI-1 index and the actual cost chang
es experienced by the oil pipeline 
industry every five years, to ensure that rates are just and reaso
nable. 
The attempt to streamline the process of setting transport ra
tes is in recognition of the heavy 
burden of the previous system. The option of seeking market-
based rates indicates that in certain 
circumstances the regulatory controls are not necessary, but
 the burden of proof lies with the 
pipeline companies and is itself a protracted exercise. It sho
uld also be noted that to date the 
litigants have been pipeline owners seeking a review of the r
ate setting methodology. Since the 
Commerce Act covers both road and rail transportation betwee
n states, intermodal competition is 
effectively curtailed, limiting competition between pipelines
. Liberalizing all the oil transport 
modes and allowing universal market based prices could be m
ore efficient. 
The historical background to the US regulatory environment 
has led to the current structure and 
the relatively heavy-handed approach to transport tariff regula
tion (Econ 2000). 
6.7 Brazilian Legislation 
The Brazilian system combines aspects of both the UK and 
US systems (Econ 2000). The key 
primary legislation is the I 997 Petroleum Law, which establi
shed an independent regulatory 
body, the National Petroleum Agency (NPA), charged with 
carrying out the country's energy 
policy. Prior to this law government regulation was carried ou
t through the auspices of the state-
owned oil and gas company, Petrobras. 
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Under article 56 of the Petroleum Act, authorization is required from the NPA to construct an oil 
pipeline. The NP A is charged to "issue norms on the eligibility of interested parties, and the 
conditions for the authorization and transfer of its entitlement, observing the fulfillment of the 
requirements for environment protection and traffic safety." 
Third party access to oil pipelines is guaranteed under article 58, which specifies that "any 
interested party may use the transportation pipelines and the maritime terminals, existing or to be 
built, through adequate remuneration to the entitled holder of the installation." Article 5 8 (1) 
specifies that where agreement is not reached between the pipeline owner and third parties, it is 
for the NPA to establish the level of adequate remuneration, ensuring it is compatible with 
market prices. The NPA also regulates priority afforded to the handling of third party product. 
Under article 8 (VI) the ANP must have established the criteria it will use in calculating the fees 
for pipeline transportation. 
In principle it is for the individual companies involved to determine transport tariffs and access 
charges in line with the UK system. But unlike the UK system it is a regulatory agency and not 
the Secretary of State who is the arbiter in any disagreement. The agency's functions are closer to 
the US FERC's, but they do not extend to setting all oil pipeline transport tariffs, only for those 
for which there is a dispute. However, without enshrining the methodology for any dispute 
resolution in law, it could well mean the NPA is open to legal challenges to its chosen 
methodology. It is important that a system for challenging the regulatory authorities' 
methodology and findings is in place (Econ 2000). 
6.8 Other Countries 
Most Western European countries have adopted a similar approach to the UK system. In some 
instances pipeline operators are required to publish or post with the government/regulator their 
transport tariffs, but the cost basis for the tariffs is not investigated unless called upon by a third 
party. 
In New Zealand, the 1937 Petroleum Act contains similar provisions to the UK's 1962 Act (E;con 
2000). Under normal circumstances the transport tariffs and access conditions are the subject of 
the commercial parties and the government only gets involved ifthere is a dispute. Under section 
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63 of the 1937 Act, third parties can appeal to the Minister for the right to use an
 authorized 
pipeline. The Minister can set the charges for access under section 64 (1 b) or the mat
ter could be 
referred to arbitration by the Minister or any other party involved in the dispute. 
In Australia, pipelines are regulated by the 1967 Pipelines Act. The Act follows the f
ormat of the 
UK 1962 Act, with third parties able to appeal to the Minister if they fail to reac
h an access 
agreement with the pipeline owner (Econ 2000). Under section 23 of the 1967 Act 
a third party 
may appeal to the Minister if three months have expired since they requested acc
ess and no 
agreement has been reached. According to a recent review, the provisions under thi
s section of 
the Act have never been used. 
The Australians are currently reviewing the 1967 Pipeline Act. A Paper prepared 
for the New 
South Wales government has taken a broad view of the Act and International trend
s and states 
that: "While the need for government intervention has not disappeared, the for
m that this 
intervention should take has been the subject of review. It is now recognized that p
rescriptive 
regulation can be expensive and may not achieve the regulatory objectives. Regu
lations that 
concentrate on ends rather than means provide more discretion, and greater accou
ntability; to 
industry in the way it achieves the necessary regulatory outcomes. An immediate be
nefit is that 
this places more of the decision making in the hands of those who are likely to ha
ve the most 
information; industry rather than the regulators." In the context of oil pipeline regula
tion, this is 
an important point (Econ 2000). 
7. INDUSTRY VIEWS ON PIPELINE REGULATION 
7 .1 Groupings 
The viewpoints of some key stakeholders in the petroleum pipeline industry 
are briefly 
summarized in this chapter. The process of soliciting stakeholder views started with g
rouping key 
stakeholders into what was considered appropriate categories. The final groups were 
as follows: 
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7.1.1 Coastal Refiners: 
Comprising of BP, Shell, Engen and Caltex. Between them, they own Sapref and Enrefrefineries 
in Durban as well as Calref in Cape Town. These are considered key stakeholders because 
pipelines, their own or those owned by Petronet, transport crude from port/s to their refineries, as 
well refined product from their refineries to storage facilities and depots. These companies are 
also the shareholders of the only crude SBM facility in South Africa, which is in Durban. 
7.1.2 Inland Refiners: 
Consist of Total and Sasol. Total and Sasol jointly own Natref, the inland refinery based at Coal 
Brook. Their crude is transported by pipeline from the coast, and their finished product is also 
transported by pipeline to market. In addition, Sasol, the synfuel producer owns coal-to-liquid 
refineries at Secunda and Sasolburg. Its finished product is also transported via pipeline to 
Gauteng markets. 
7.1.3 The Major Pipeline owner: 
The Department of Public Enterprises, which owns the parastatal Transnet, which in turn owns 
Petronet. OPE and Transnet were interviewed separately. 
7.1.4 The existing regulator: 
DME, unlike other regulators whose views were solicited through an identical method, DME's 
views were expressed through a series of meetings with the Directorate of Hydrocarbons over a 
three months period . 
7.1.5 Empowerment companies: 
Empowerment companies are companies owned and controlled by citizens of South Africa 
previously disadvantaged under the apartheid government whose rule ended in 1994. The 
companies, which include Tepco (now a member of SAPIA as well), Excel, Afric Oil and Zenex) 
would normally express their common position through their organization, the African Minerals 
and Energy Forum (AMEF). However, in this instance, they selected Excel, whose senior 
executive is one of the most active members of AMEF, to speak on their behalf. 
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7.1.6 The aviation industry: 
This stakeholder has a key interest in ensuring competitive transport tariffs for delivery of
 
aviation fuel. 
7.1. 7 Independent storage facility operators: 
The management of the Island View storage facility in Durban. 
7.1.8 The pipeline owner and operator: 
Petronet, the pivotal stakeholder in the petroleum pipelines industry was interviewed alone. 
7.1.9 Fuel Users 
It is considered a major weakness of this research that fuel users were not consulted. The users 
fall into the following categories: 
• Domestic users 
• Commercial users 
• Industry and agriculture users 
It is assumed that most of these users have a strong interest in getting tariffs reduced. 
After the above categorization, a questionnaire was designed to solicit stakeholder views. The 
questionnaire is attached as an appendix. The stakeholders were given a choice ofresponding as 
follows: 
• They could either complete the questionnaire or simply return it. 
However, if they felt that issues that they wished addressed were not adequately covered by 
the questionnaire, they were invited to request personal interviews; 
• They could summarize their issues and request personal 
interviews; 
• They could respond with detailed written submissions. 
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Where the researchers felt that responses did not address the issues in sufficient detail, they
 
requested to see the stakeholder/s for personal interviews. 
In the end, the stakeholder views expressed in this report were secured by a combination of 
responses to the questionnaire, detailed written submissions and interviews. The final set of views
 
was refined through two stakeholder workshops, held as part of the consultation process. 
7.2 Key Stakeholder Positions 
7.2.1 The Department of Minerals and Energy 
DME, through its Hydrocarbons Directorate, currently holds regulatory authority over petroleum
 
pipelines. It currently exercises this authority through Petron et. DME is also the driver of the 
process of regulating petroleum pipelines. 
From a series of meetings with its officials, DME made it clear that it expects an effective
 
regulatory regime for pipelines. Unlike gas, for which the department initiated the regulation
 
process recently, where the regulatory regime is considered light, the department feels that the
 
petroleum pipeline industry is mature and requires a stronger regulatory regime. 
The department was also clear about third party access in petroleum pipelines. It said this was not 
negotiable . The driver for this expectation is DME's commitment to black economic
 
empowerment as outlined in the White Paper on Energy Policy ( 1998). 
Furthermore, the department was clear that it wants a regulatory regime attractive to potential
 
investors in pipeline. Consequently, conditions must be clarified on issues regarding taxation. 
Among other things, the department expected the study and consultation 
process to clarify: 
• Servitude issues on pipelines in relation to the Municipal Systems Bill. 
• Boundary and product definitions. Boundaries must be clarified 
between activities or utilization of services such as SBMs etc, while definition clarity 
is required on the different products carried by the pipelines. 
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• Storage facilities. Here again the focus would be on boundaries an
d access. 
7.2.2 Petronet 
Together with consumers, Petronet stands to be most affected by p
ipeline regulation. Petronet 
expressed its stakeholder views in a detailed response to the quest
ionnaire, through a written 
submission and personal interviews between the researcher and their
 chief executive. 
Overall, Petronet believes petroleum pipelines are a natural monopol
y 
and must be regulated. However, they believe the regulatory regime m
ust 
be light and flexible because: 
1. The ownership of Petron et itself is uncertain. Thus, they would p
refer a regime which 
can accommodate such future changes; 
2. The regulation of the whole petroleum industry itself is uncerta
in. They would thus 
prefer a regime flexible enough to accommodate the current status, re
-regulation and/or 
de-regulation of the industry when it comes. 
Among other issues, which the regulatory regime must address, Petro
net 
felt that: 
• Regulation must address ALL modes of transportation for 
petroleum products, i.e. road, rail and pipelines. In Petronet's
 view, there is 
competition in the industry. In particular, road was singled out as n
ot paying its full 
cost of damage caused to road infrastructure through transporting pet
roleum products 
on long distances. Thus Petronet would consider it a contradiction i
f pipelines alone 
were regulated with road and rail excluded. 
• A tariff-setting model based on revenue required would be ideal. 
• The regulatory regime must ensure industry efficiency (e.g. ad
dress slippage and 
uneven flow issues) and orderly development of the network sin
ce there exists 
capacity constraints. 
• The liquid fuels industry is not normal because it is interspers
ed with regulations 
based on rules, agreements and arrangements. A number of these arra
ngements centre 
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on the synfuel producer, Sasol. These regulations must be norma
lized by ordinary 
transparent, legal mechanisms because they affect the operations of
 Petronet. 
7.2.3 Inland Refiners 
Inland refiners have doubts about the need for regulation of pipeline
s-they would probably slash 
Sasol profits. That said, they agree with Petronet in being concern
ed about road transport not 
carrying its share of infrastructure costs. They would wish this is
sue to be investigated by an 
independent study. They also concur that Petron et is a natural monop
oly, rather than one declared 
by law. 
Inland refiners hold a particularly strong position on crude oil pip
elines. They would not like 
them regulated since they consider them part of their production pr
ocess. In this regard, they do 
not believe issues of open access, transparency of tariffs, etc, sho
uld be applied to crude oil 
pipelines. Rather, they would prefer that the crude lines be sold to
 owners of the refiners who 
utilize all their crude. (Thus ensuring any competitive investmen
t in inland crude refining is 
impossible). 
That said, in the event that a petroleum pipeline regulator is appoint
ed, 
inland refiner emphasized that: 
• Their preferred regulatory option would be the FERC (Federal 
Energy Regulatory Committee) method applied mainly in the Unite
d States; 
• Licenses should be approved for pipeline construction on the basi
s 
of a business case that adds value to the economy, and also on 
principles of common 
carrier, non-discriminatory tariffs, equitable tariffs (fare rate ofreturn
); 
• The location advantage which inland refiners currently enjoy must
 
be respected and maintained ; 
• They offer three options which the regulator may choose from in 
dealing with the issue of so-called "Natref neutrality" ; 
• 
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• The two-part tariff model is not acceptable to them, as they prefer t
he same tariff for same 
service. The refiners also outline a number of what they term 'rul
es of carriage ' that 
they consider important and must be addressed. 
7.2.4 Coastal Refiners 
Coastal refiners also perceive the petroleum pipeline industry as co
mpetitive, despite Petronet' s 
natural monopoly position. This refers to competition from road a
nd rail , particularly for long 
distances. 
Because of pipelines' natural monopoly position and the fact that 
these were publicly funded , 
they believe pipelines should be regulated. They also view the 
current MRG pipeline as a 
petroleum pipeline, funded by the state for petroleum purposes. Con
sequently, they would wish it 
to be regulated as a petroleum rather than gas pipeline. 
The refiners made it clear that for assets that were privately fun
ded , like SBMs and storage 
facilities, they would oppose any proposal to regulate them. To them
, current conditions relating 
to access on assets like SBMs and storage facilities are sufficientl
y competitive not to warrant 
regulation. Complications that could arise from the MP AR guide
lines highlight some of the 
difficulties that would arise from regulating privately funded assets. 
Their views ofcoastal refiners on road haulage correspond with thos
e of their inland counterparts 
and Petronet. They also believe that road haulers are not paying the f
ull cost ofroad infrastructure 
utilization. Because of the distortion ofroad haulage costs, some sto
rage facilities and depots are 
being forced to close. 
Finally, coastal refiners believe that in the event that inland refiners 
are allowed to buy their long 
crude line, they should also be permitted to buy the long line tha
t transports their product to 
markets. 
7.2.5 Empowerment Companies 
Empowerment companies have concerns about their survival and gr
owth. They would like to see 
a regulatory regime, which not only creates a level playing field for t
hem as small companies, but 
tilts the field in their favor, thus allowing them to catch up. To them
, the most important issue is 
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access, be it to pipelines, SBMs or storage facilities. They believe that owing to lack of
 
transparency, it is possible that they pay higher handling and storage costs than established
 
companies. They believe this situation might get worse when the Sasol agreement expires. They
 
would like regulation to cover the entire logistical infrastructure of petroleum pipelines, including
 
Island View storage facilities that handle imports. 
7.2.6 The Airline Industry 
This industry is most concerned with costs. The airline industry is: 
• Advocating for adoption of activity-based costing in the 
determination of allowed costs; 
• Advocating for tariffs which are cost-based; 
• Concerned about how assets will be valued; 
• Of the opinion that pipeline companies are entitled to a commercial 
return on assets; 
• Concerned about how the regulatory body will be staffed and where it will be located. 
7.2. 7 The Department of Transport 
Ordinarily, the Department of Transport would be expected to be a key stakeholder since this
 
industry is about transportation ofliquid fuels. However, Petronet's submission observes that: 
"The White Paper on Transportation is totally silent on the pipeline transport mode. This 
is also true of the Moving South Africa (MSA) initiative of the Department of 
Transport(although it mentions problems with the overall pricing of transport and 
resultant market distortions that affect pipelines). We have had very close alignment with 
the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) as opposed to the other transport divisions 
in Transnet which have had their links with The Department of Transport." 
The Department of Transport's lack of interest in pipelines might appear insignificant, but it has 
the potential of creating complications for the pipeline regulator. This is because road and rail,
 
which fall directly under its policy mandate, have a direct impact on volumes, tariffs and 
investment in pipelines. 
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7.2.8 Transnet 
Transnet policy on pipelines is influerrced the parent shareholder, the Department of Public 
Enterprises. In turn, Transnet policies guide their subsidiary Petronet. However, as is indicated 
above, neither the Department of Transport nor the Department of Public Enterprises has ever 
been active in the formulation of policies that influence pipelines. The policy process that 
influenced the creation of a pipeline regulator occurred with minimum input from both 
departments. 
7.2.9 The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) 
The DPE is the ultimate shareholder of Petronet. Its policies and strategies are implemented 
through the parent company Transnet, a key state-owned enterprise. 
In 2000, DPE announced to the public its policy towards state-owned enterprises in its policy 
blueprint called: 'An Accelerated Agenda Towards The Restructuring of State-Owned 
Enterprises: Policy Framework'. 
These policy guidelines directly affect Petronet and its pipeline business. Among many other 
policy pronouncements, the policy framework indicates that: The government's economic growth 
policy (GEAR) proposes a phased process of restructuring in order to maximize value and to 
ensure adequate regulatory :frameworks are put in place. 
Heightened competition has necessitated the development of increasingly sophisticated 
regulatory regimes for the licensing of the energy industry. This has resulted in a trend towards 
re-regulation of the energy sector and: 
• Increasing competition has also meant that there is less need for the regulation of 
prices. 
• Thus, the direction and areas of emphasis of whatever regulatory dispensation for 
petroleum pipelines must fall within the guidelines of the above DPE policy 
:framework. 
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There remains uncertainty around Petronet's ownership. Current investiga
tions have examined 
the possibility of selling it to The Central Energy Fund or disposing it to the
 private sector. 
The Department of Public Enterprises also disclosed that it had received not
ification from cabinet 
that it must limit what it describes as "the proliferation of regulators" in a
ll sectors. This is an 
extremely important point in view of the limited impact that the pipeline
 regulator is likely to 
have, especially in relation to cost. 
7.3 Summary of Key Issues 
Overall, there is consensus on the following issues: 
• The need for regulation of natural monopolies which were financed 
by public funds; 
• That should regulation occur, it must address empowerment 
concerns; 
• That if it occurs, it must address access issues in one way or 
another; 
• That boundaries around product and services must be clarified; 
• That regulation should be through legislation and associated 
regulations and not agreements; 
• In broad terms that pipelines should be regulated in terms of 
construction, operation and decommissioning; 
• That issues such as health, environment and safety should be 
regulated, and that these issues can be addressed ' up-front' in legislation; 
• That expropriation should be included in the regulatory 
framework; 
• That contentious and complex issues might need some measure of 
discretion in a changing environment; 
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• That even currently, some form of competition exists in the 
industry of transporting petroleum products . This competition is between road, rail and 
pipelines, despite the fact that pipelines are a natural monopoly; 
• Road haulage is not paying its full cost of infrastructure utilization, and that this distorts 
operations of the petroleum transportation industry. 
On the other hand, there is no agreement on: 
• The scope of regulation, particularly whether to include storage 
facilities and SBMs or not; 
• The need, if any, for regulation of privately funded assets; 
• The type ofregulation for pipelines in respects of: 
Competition regulation (methodology and scope) 
Economic regulation (price setting and tariffs) 
Regulatory methodology for the different pipeline issues; 
• How to deal with existing rules, agreements and arrangements 
which have been operating in the industry for many years ; 
• How to approach the need for orderly development of the petroleum pipeline network. 
Finally, there is no consensus on which issues must fall within the general authority of 
competition authorities. The authority of the future petroleum pipeline regulator (if it is 
established), which issues must be left to the industry to deal with, and which ones should remain 
with DME, the current regulatory authority. 
8. LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS 
8.1 Existing agreements that regulate the sector 
The petroleum industry in South Africa generally operates on the strength of agreements, both 
formal and informal based on the understanding of the role players. A relatively small part of the 
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activities in the industry are governed by legislation. As will be seen below, this raises questions
 
about the appropriateness of establishing a specific sub-sector regulator in an industry that, in its
 
entirety is so highly regulated by both the government through legislation and by large web of
 
agreements among the players themselves. 
This in itself makes it d i:fficult to do a satisfactory comparison as far as legislation and regulation
 
are concerned in that agreements are historic in origin, complicated and often open to different
 
interpretations, even among the role-players themselves . However, the important factor is that
 
legislation in general overrides agreements and that in this context it serves an important
 
purpose-to try and determine the influence of legislation, both present and envisaged, on the
 
petroleum industry. Other legislation that may have an impact on petroleum pipeline legislation
 
and regulation is illustrated in Figure 9.1. 
Succession of SA 
Transport Services Act 
Petroleum 
Products Act ... ~ - ~ Municipal Systems Bill, 
..,. • ~ Gas Bill 
Central Energy Legislation 
Fund Act .. 
Income Tax Act 
M;n,,.l,Ad ~ ..... ~ 
Minerals Resources Bill -
Competition Act 
Occupational/Mine Health and Safety Act 
Hazardous Substances Act 
Figure 1: Interface with other legislation 
Below is a review of the most important legislation that impacts or may impact on petroleum
 
liquid pipeline matters. 
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8.1.1 Succession of South Africa Transport Services Act 
This Act paved the way for the formation of the old SA Transport Services into different 
companies with Government as the initial shareholder. As a result thereof Petronet was 
established as a separate company, albeit as a full subsidiary of the holding company, Transnet. 
8.1.2 Petroleum Products Act 
This Act, some of whose provisions are currently being reviewed, provides that the Minister may 
publish the price at which petroleum products are sold to consumers (e.g. the pump price of 
petrol). Although the Act provides for a wide variety of possible regulations to regulate the 
industry, this is not used actively. Instead, there is a large reliance on agreements between the 
industry and government relating to or impacting on issues such as transport costs of fuel, 
interaction and sales between players, permission to erect and operate service stations and so on. 
In reality the Petroleum Products Act is thus only used as a mechanism to enforce the effect of 
the contractual arrangements and other governmental objectives (such as taxes) toward third 
parties not involved or bound by the agreements. To some extent it serves as a deterrent in the 
sense that the "threat" exists that Government may use it if needed. 
8.1.3 Central Energy Fund Act 
This Act inter a/ia provides for the establishment of the Petroleum Equalization Fund as a 
mechanism whereby the price of crude oil can be equalized over a period of time. (All purchases 
and all sales of crude are channeled through the fund). The CEF (Pty) Ltd operates it, a company 
wholly-owned by the state. As part of its operations CEF, through one of its subsidiaries called 
the Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF), also owns large storage facilities in the Western Cape. Mossgas, 
another one of its subsidiaries is involved in producing petroleum products from gas, while its 
other subsidiary, Soekor, undertakes production and exploration in South African territorial 
waters. The Central Energy Fund Act does not per se impact on petroleum pipelines, but it might 
do so indirectly regarding storage facilities and exploration pipelines. 
The Central Energy Fund as an organization is currently undergoing a major restructuring process 
to bring its objectives in line with the expectations of the democratic government. 
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8.1.4 Minerals Act 
In terms of the Minerals Act, currently undergoing major changes, the offshore
 rights to oil and 
gas deposits belong to the Government. Prospective developers and prospe
ctors of fields have to 
obtain permission (prospecting and mining permits) from the Government
 or Soekor (now The 
Petroleum Agency of South Africa) to explore and develop. Part of the
 condition relates to 
standards of construction and operation while the Mine Health and Safe
ty Act govern safety 
aspects. The Minerals Act also deals with environmental aspects, · su
ch as rehabilitation, 
guarantees etc . This applies both to offshore facilities and pipelines from tho
se facilities inland in 
so far as it forms part of the "mining" area. There is new proposed le
gislation called The 
Minerals Development Bill, which is currently going through the Pa
rliamentary process. 
Significant changes that affect mineral rights are the cornerstone of this bill.
 
8.1.5 Occupational Health and Safety Act 
The normal provisions of the Occupational Health and Safety Act will app
ly to the construction 
and operation ofliquid pipelines, except for offshore pipelines where the M
ine Health and Safety 
Act will apply. The same holds true for environmental legislation, where th
e offshore part will be 
regulated through the Minerals Act and the rest through general environmen
tal requirements and 
legislation. The Hazardous Substances Act plays a role in the storage, sale 
and transport of such 
substances. 
8.1.6 Municipal Systems Bill 
This bill . spells out the competencies of local authorities in its area of ju
risdiction. Although 
petroleum pipelines do not form part of the constitutional capabilities of l
ocal authorities, local 
authorities may have an indirect affect on the construction and operation
 of pipelines over its 
geographical area ofresponsibility. Examples are the power to expropriate, 
granting of servitudes 
and health, safety and environmental concerns. It could have a direct influenc
e on a petroleum 
pipeline being converted into a gas pipeline or vice versa. Gas reticulatio
n is a local authority 
competency in terms of the constitution and this would be especially import
ant at the distribution 
side of the pipeline. 
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8.1. 7 Income Tax Act 
In terms of the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2000, a new section 12D is inserted into the 
Income Tax Act. This section allows a deduction for the actual costs of a new pipeline, and 
includes gas, oil and petroleum product pipelines per definition. The allowance will be 10% per
 
year. In other words, a new pipeline can be written off in 10 years. 
8.1.8 Competition Act 
In terms of the Competition Act, the Competition Authority is responsible to investigate and 
report on competition issues. At present the Competition Act specifically exclude the activities of
 
any person whose activities are governed under other legislation. However, the Act is in the 
process of being amended to the effect that the powers of the Competition Authority will extend 
to all competition issues. This means that the activities of sectoral regulators in relation to 
competition issues will also fall under the auspices of the Competition Act. 
Because of the proposed changes to the Competition Act, it might be considered prudent to delay
 
the establishment of all regu!ators whose role might overlap with the Competition Act, the 
pipeline regulator being one. Indeed, some might argue that in view of these changes which are 
expected to give the Competition Commission more effective powers to be pro-active, the need 
for independent regulators for small industry sectors becomes questionable. The manner in which 
the Competition Act currently functions is very much ex post facto ( except on issues relating to 
mergers), in the sense that investigations are only lodged and complaints investigated after the 
industry is established, or if something is deemed worth investigating. It differs in this context 
from the electricity industry, for instance, where a license is needed before the activity is 
embarked upon. What is important for any envisaged regulation is that the interface between that
 
legislation and the scope and ambit of the Competitions Act is clearly addressed if the former in 
any way is to impact on or regulate competition aspects. 
8.2 Present Regulatory Arrangements 
The South African liquid fuels industry is characterized by a web of complex regulations, which 
impact the transportation of liquid fuels. These regulations are currently in the process of being 
amended and government has embarked on a major program to re-regulate the industry (Minister
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of Minerals and Energy, 2000). This development brings into question the appropriateness o
f 
introducing a specific sub-sector (i.e . pipelines) regulator into an industry which is right in th
e 
middle of such wide-ranging regulatory up-changes. 
8.2.1 Price control 
Petroleum products are divided into regulated and non-regulated products. These are furthe
r 
divided into controlled (petrol, diesel and kerosene) as well as non-controlled products (jet fue
l , 
power paraffin, bitumen, lubricants, fuel oil and LPG). The basic price for controlled products 
is 
calculated daily and published by CEF. Petrol price is regulated up to the retail price, wherea
s 
retail price for diesel is not, but there is a set maximum wholesale price. 
8.2.2 IBLC 
The Petroleum products pricing chain comprise of the following components: Free on Boar
d 
Price (FOB), Rand/Dollar Exchange Rate, Freight cost, Insurance and Losses, Landing an
d 
Wharfage, IBLC Price, Refining Margin; Wholesale Price, Retail Margin, Taxes and Levies. 
8.2.3 Wholesale Price 
The wholesale price is made up of the IBLC and various other components listed below
. 
Wholesale prices are maximum prices and may be discounted. Wholesale price is controlled. Th
e 
wholesalers lift the product at the refinery gate at an IBLC price and take it to various depot
s, 
service stations and direct consumers throughout the country. Rail, trucks and pipelines d
o 
transportation of the products. The service station and direct consumers pay the wholesale pric
e 
to the wholesaler. 
Components of the wholesale price include: 
• Zone Differential (for inland transportation); 
• Service Differential (for inland transportation); 
• Taxes and Levies (Fuel Tax, Customs and Exercise, Road Accident 
Fund and Equalization Fund); 
• Other costs; 
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• Wholesale Margin. 
8.2.4 Taxes and levies 
Taxes and levies on liquid fuels include: 
• Custom and Excise Duty which is imposed on petrol and diesel; 
• Road Accident Fund levy that is determined by the Minister of 
Transport in conjunction with the Minister of Finance and used to finance road acci
dent 
third party claims. RAF contribution is approximately 14.5% a litre for petrol and 10.
3% a 
litre for diesel; 
• Equalization Fund levy is a fixed monetary levy, determined in terms of the C
entral 
Energy Fund Act, by the Minister of Minerals and Energy in conjunction with t
he 
Minister of Finance. 
8.2.5 Control of wholesale margins on petroleum products 
The issue of controlled margins has a major impact on regulation of any aspect of th
e petroleum 
sector in South Africa. Wholesale (marketing margin) is aimed at granting m
arketers a 
benchmark return of 15% on depreciated book value of assets with allowance fo
r additional 
depreciation, but before tax and payment of interest. The profitability of the
 wholesale 
marketers is calculated on the previous year's results and does not take into a
ccount the 
inflationary increase in the current year. The wholesale margin is determined by the 
DME using 
the MP AR (marketing of petroleum products activities return) guideline. The wholesa
le margin is 
only adjusted if the industry average return on assets is above 20% or below
 10%. An 
independent firm of accountants audits the returns. 
The regulation of pipelines alone, to the exclusion of other modes of transportation
 of product 
like rail, road and storage will have a major impact on the heart of the regim
e currently 
controlling prices. This is because, as indicated earlier, the transportation of crude 
and product 
from the coast to retail outlets is integrated, and current costing is based on this integ
ration. 
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8.3 Industry Agreements 
There are number of agreements currently governing or impacting on the regulatory environment 
for the petroleum pipelines industry. These agreements are extremely important, and will have a 
major impact on the effectiveness ofregulation of pipelines. Because they are so far-reaching and 























Figure 2: Industry agreements impacting petroleum pipeline transport 
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The following two are probably the most important: the 1992 'NatrefNeutrality' agreement and 
the Sasol Supply Agreement. The key features of these two agreements are outlined below. 
8.3.1 'NatrefNeutrality' 
The so-called 'Natref neutrality" has been given various names by people, but basically refers to 
the current link between the refined product pipeline tariffs and Natref s crude oil pipeline tariffs. 
The agreement is, in fact an unwritten commercial understanding, a 'gentlemen's agreement 
aimed at ensuring that the inland refinery, Natref, is not unduly disadvantaged by its location, and 
that the tariffs charged for finished products are balanced with tariffs charged for crude 
transportation. The history of the agreement dates back to the days when Transnet, using the 
cheapest mode of transport for each zone, transported all liquid fuels. Total had intended building 
its own refinery at Richards Bay, but was convinced by government to join with Sasol and the 
National Iranian Oil Company and build Natref on the promise that being an inland refinery 
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would not disadvantage them. The enforceability of the agreement i
s questionable and would be 
over-ruled by legislation/regulation. 
Today, all oil companies,except Mossgas profit from transport in t
he over recovery in the zone 
price, which is conservatively estimated at about R80m/annum. Thi
s is a very important issue in 
the petroleum industry today, yet it is an issue that the proposed re
gulatory regime for pipelines 
will not address. Logistics is a key aspect for any oil company that 
profits through optimization. 
Much investment has gone into Natref, upgrading it to a refinery wit
h cracking capacity to obtain 
a 90% white oil yield to prevent backhauling ofresidual and other p
roducts. 
8.3.2 Sasol Supply Agreement 
When Natrefwas established in 1971, it was agreed with South Afri
can oil companies that Sasol 
would not establish its own retail chain but would sell its white
 products through other oil 
companies' outlets, subject to contract volume limits--each compa
ny doing so in proportion to 
its national market share. To better balance the supply and dema
nd of fuels, this commercial 
agreement was expanded to include all of the group's synthetic fuel
 production after Sasol 2 and 
Sasol 3 were commissioned. This agreement entitles Sasol to furn
ish about 7 .7 billion litres of 
finished product per annum in the "Sasol Supply Area". Sasol has
 given notice on the present 
upliftment agreement. The oil industry and the Sasol are at present n
egotiating a new agreement. 
Synthetic fuels save South Africa billions in foreign exchange and h
ence the view of the Energy 
White Paper that synfuels should be accommodated in the econo
my as much as possible. At 
$20/bbl crude oil prices, Sasol saves the country more than US$1 
billion per annum in foreign 
exchange. This agreement gives Sasol the task of deciding the pro
duct flow pattern and hence 
the pipeline utilization as Sasol plans the supply to the oil companie
s in the area. It must be noted 
that Sasol also distributes Total's production volume from Nat
ref into the inland market. 
According to an exchange agreement between Total and other oil co
mpanies, Total's production 
is supplied to them inland and in exchange they provide volume to T
otal at the coast. 
The current upliftment agreement includes Sasol's portion of Na
tref production in the Sasol 
quota, giving Sasol flexibility in deciding on the source of product. S
asol production volumes are 
allocated between the various oil companies. The Sasol supply grou
p, on routine monthly basis, 
determines the product availability from Natref and Secunda and as
sesses for which area, within 
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Sasol 's supply area, has sufficient product to supply. The balance of the requirement in the Sasol 
supply area will be declared as a shortfall and will be supplied by the oil companies from coastal 
refineries. This information is formally communicated, with a four-week notice period to the oil 
industry to give it time to supply the balance of the requirement that Sasol is unable to meet. 
These variations are reflected in the ex-Durban product pipeline utilization that ranges from 
below 30% to over I 00%. The annual volume supplied by Sasol to the oil companies is fixed. 
Sasol uses the oil company market forecasts to plan the monthly supplies to them. 
8.3.3 Other relevant industry agreements 
A number of other industry agreements also impact the petroleum pipelines industry and on 
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Some of these existing agreements are briefly described below. 
8.3.4 Blue Pump Agreement 
This agreement limits Sasol's direct marketing of petroleum products. In terms of this agreement, 
Sasol is not allowed to operate its own service stations. Sasol is only allowed to market its 
products at the roster sites allocated by DME in terms of the Ratplan. Out of the 194 roster sites 
available countrywide, 30 are Sasol branded through blue pumps on the forecourts of the service 
stations of other oil companies. In addition, Sasol may not exceed 9.23% of the total market and 
sales are also geographically restricted to the Sasol supply area. 
The blue pump agreement is scheduled to expire at the end of2003, but could be brought forward 
by the Competition Commission which in August 2001, commenced investigations into Sasol 
contracts (Business Day, 2001). In June 2001, Sasol announced its intention to enter the retail 
market, a move that might force government to intervene in order to facilitate an orderly 
transition from the old order (Business Day, 2001). 
8.3.5 Product Exchange Agreement 
The wholesalers or refiners have entered into product exchange agreements to serve different 
geographic markets in the country. The Durban refineries supply the KwaZulu-Natal area, 
neighboring countries and parts of the Cape region. Calref supplies the Cape Province. Mossgas 
supplies the areas surrounding Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth and East London. SSF and Natref 
supply Gauteng, Free State, Mpumalanga, Northern Province, parts of KwaZulu-Natal and 
Northern Cape. 
8.3.6 Conveyance Agreement between Sasol and Petronet 
This agreement was entered into between Sasol and Petronet. It came into effect on 1 November 
1965. This agreement governs: the operation of pipelines, ownership, operation and maintenance 
of feeder lines, metering of petroleum products, custody of products, quality control, sampling, 
disposal of intermixture, quality control, mode of transporting products after commissioning of 
main pipeline, condition of conveyance, tariff and termination of agreement. 
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The above web of agreements literally "run" or manage the petroleum industry. This will 
certainly affect how the regulator of pipelines will be able to discharge his her responsibilities . 
Yet, as currently designed, the regulator will not have any direct power over these agreements . 
This certainly brings into question the relevance and appropriateness of such a regulatory 
institution. 
9. CONCLUSION 
The huge administrative burden of the American FERC system make it unattractive for the South 
African economic situation. As a developing country, SA has limited administrative capacity and 
has been struggling to effectively implement telecommunications regulation, among other 
regulatoion. Technical capacity is a crucial resource not to be used up in unnecessary procedures 
that can be achieved in more effective ways. The burden on companies will deter investment 
and/or require a larger return-hence higher tariffs-as the "regulatory risk" increases. As a 
blueprint for South Africa, a more light-handed form of regulation is recommended. The biggest 
burden of the US system arises from its huge administrative demands and large amounts of work 
imposed on pipeline operators (Econ 2000). 
A web of regulations, agreements and arrangements surround the petroleum industry in South 
Africa. These have been outlined above. This web has a major impact on how transporters of 
petroleum products, in particular, do business. In the event of establishing a regulator for 
pipelines who has no authority over these other agreements and arrangements, legal 
complications are almost inevitable. It can be envisaged that a regulator of pipelines is likely to 
find itself making decisions that have major knock-on effects on this web of agreements and 
regulations. To implement decisions is likely to require shifting through this huge web of 
regulations, agreements and legislation thereby causing delays resulting in frustration and 
ineffectiveness of the regulator. Petronet has indicated that these arrangements have a major 
impact on how they do business (Petronet, 2000). 
Over the years, the transport part of the regulated system has been "deregulated by default." 
Producers get transporters to do the transport at rates/tariffs lower than that recovered in the 
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pump price and then "pocket" the difference. The regulation process requires that the pump price 
be adjusted to the lower transport cost level but that never happens. Non-transporters are 
presently making money out of transportation (Petronet, 2001) 
This is just one of several critical areas of the petroleum transportation industry which a pipeline 
regulator cannot have authority over. Yet it is an area that directly affects the returns of pipeline 
operators. This in tum affects the industry' s attractiveness to investors, and thereby potential 
growth. It could be argued that a sub-optimal regulatory regime could in fact do more harm than 
good. This area alone calls into question the appropriateness of establishing a regulator that 
cannot regulate an important component of the industry. 
It was indicated at the beginning of this study that the road is the overall main mode of 
transportation for petroleum products. Transport by truck is a cheap alternative (without 
assuming discounts on return trips) in 3 8 of 219 road routes (Road Freight Association, 2000). 
Even on long distances from Durban to the inland market, more than 20% of petroleum products 
are moved by road despite the existence of a pipeline infrastructure with spare capacity at times. 
As currently designed, the pipeline regulator would have no authority over this activity, yet it is 
an activity which has had a major impact on volumes with a pipeline operator. With such a major 
impact on volumes, it affects projected returns as well as investor attitudes towards new 
pipelines. 
Petronet operates 3000km of pipelines, and is by far the largest petroleum pipeline owner and 
operator in South Africa. Most crude pipelines (except the one feeding Natret) are owned and 
operated by the oil companies that own the refineries that they feed with products. By world 
standards, the pipeline infrastructure, which transports 64% of product consumed in the country, 
is tiny in an industry whose major barriers to entry is the amount of capital required (Econ, 1999). 
It had a replacement value of only R 7b in 1999. The current proposal to establish a pipeline 
regulator aims to create an institution that will have no say in the mode of transportation of 36% 
of product. 
It has been estimated that the costs of establishing it is R2.4m (Sad-Elec, 2000). It is further 
estimated that the costs of running the institution would be approximately R4.3m per year (Sad-
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Elec, 2000). Yet, that institution would have no regulatory powers over how 30% of petroleum 
· product is transported. This is quite clearly a sub-optimal regulatory institution. 
Finally, the Competition Commission is undergoing major changes expected to give it more 
"teeth". Competition issues are likely to constitute a major component of the pipeline regulator's 
work because of the needs for third party access. Several of the industry agreements are likely to 
come under the spotlight of the commission as economic empowerment gathers pace 
simultaneously with the re-regulation process. An example of this possibility has already 
appeared with conflict between empowerment company Tepco and its supplier Sasol that went 
for adjudication (Business Day, September 2001). 
If the Competition Act were being revamped to be able to deal with such issues effectively, 
would it not be more prudent for the cabinet to wait for the outcome of this process, rather than 
contradict its own commitment to minimize regulators? 
A regulator focusing on petroleum pipelines alone is likely to find it difficult to be effective. This 
is because pipelines transport just two-thirds of petroleum products. The remainder is road and 
rail, which the regulator would have no authority over. 
A second complication is likely to arise from the fact that the authority over policies that guide 
road and rail is vested in a separate government department from the department that directs the 
affairs of petroleum pipelines. Stakeholder interviews conducted as part of this study indicate that 
the Department of Transport (with responsibility for road and rail) has never made reference, or 
shown interest in petroleum pipelines. 
Thirdly, this study outlined a range of regulations, arrangements and agreements, some formal 
and some informal, which have a major impact on the operations of the entire petroleum industry 
of South Africa. A regulator established in isolation would sooner or later run into implications of 
some of these arrangements, and might find their job made impossible. As indicated above, 
Competition Commission was requested to adjudicate in a case involving Tepco Oil and Sasol 
over the alleged uncompetitive nature of the Sasol Supply Agreement. (Business Day, 2001 ). If 
the Competition Commission is the appropriate regulatory authority to deal with these informal 
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agreements, does it remain necessary to create another regulatory institution with limited powers 
over such important regulatory issues that affect the petroleum industry? 
Fourthly, the Department of Minerals and Energy itself is in the process of re-regulating the 
petroleum industry. This is being done over a period of time. This re-regulation will have a major 
impact on the web of industry agreements and some of the current legislation. This raises the 
question of just how relevant a pipeline regulator will be when the deregulation process is 
complete. 
Finally, for an industry of such a small size as pipeline transportation in South Africa, the 
necessity of a pipeline regulator might need to be reviewed. At running costs of over R4m per 
annum, but minimum impact over key issues of the transportation of petroleum products, 
justification becomes difficult. More so when the cabinet has issued a caution to government 
departments warning about its discomfort with a proliferation of regulators in the country 
(Department of Public Enterprises, 2000). 
REFERENCES 
1. Nokusa Consulting: The Development of Legislation, Regulations and Institutional 
Capacity to Regulate Liquid Petroleum Pipelines in South Africa, (Nokusa, 2000). 
2. Nokusa Consulting: Stakeholder Responses in Workshop One, (Nokusa, 2000). 
3. Armstrong M, Cowan S and Vickers J: Regulatory Reform, Economic Analysis and The 
British Experience, MIT Press, 1995 . 
4. Econ :(Econ Centre For Economic Analysis :) An International Review of Pipeline 
Regulations. Econ, Norway 2000). 
53 
5. Petronet: Detailed Information on Liquid Fuel Pipeline Regulations from Stakeholders 
(Petronet, 2000). 
6. Letsema/Nera: Restructuring of Petronet's Liquid Fuel Pipeline Tariffs (Letsema, Nera, 
South Africa, 1999). 
7. Business Day Newspaper, August 3, 2001. 
8. Trollip H, 1996. An Overview of the South African Energy Sector, Energy and 
Development Research Centre, UCT, Cape Town. 
9. Crompton R, Chief Director, Hydrocarbons Directorate, Department of Minerals and 
Energy, S.A. In Conversation, June 2000. 
10. McGowan F & Mansel R: Utilities in The E.C, Science Unit, University of Sussex, U.K. 
11. Department of Minerals and Energy: Request for Proposals, May 2000. 
12. IEA: Electricity Supply Industry-Structure, Ownership and Regulation in OECD 
Countries, 1994. 
13. IEA: Natural Gas Transportation (Organisation and Regulation), France, 1994. 
14. Jaccard M: Oscillating Currents, The Changing Rationale for Government Intervention in 
the Electricity Industry, 1994, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada. 
15. Lemmer H, Chief Executive Officer, Road Freight Association, quoted in Engineering 
News, September 27, 2001. 
16. Evert, H, Strategy and Systems GM, Spoornet, quoted in Engineering News, September 
th 27 , 2001. 
17. Engineering News, September 2?1\ 2001. 
18. ABN-AMRO, South African Liquid Fuels Industry, 1998. 
19. SANEA,An Overview of the South African Energy Scene, 1998. 
20. Sad-Elec, 2000, "Cost of Establishing a Pipeline Regulator," occasional paper by H. 
Gumede. 
21. Total S.A. 2000. Paper presented for submission to the Stakeholder Responses Workshop 
Three, by Nokusa Consulting. 
22. Department of Public Enterprises 2000 input into Stakeholder Responses at Workshop 
Three by Nokusa Consulting. 
23. Minister of Minerals and Energy, Speech in Parliament, April 2000. 
